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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOE G. TRUJILLO, also known as 
JOE GARCIA TRUJILLO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 7269 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The defendant and appellant, Joe Garcia Trujillo, appeals 
from a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree without 
recommendation, entered in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court in and for Carbon County, Utah. The defendant stood 
charged with unlawfully taking the life of Max Lopez on 
or about May 26, 1948, in Carbon County, 
There was some conflict in the testimony at the trial. 
Counsel for the defendant, in his statement of facts, reviewed 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
the testimony of each principal witness, indicating these con-
flicts. However, we feel he has fairly and adequ~tely pre-
sented the facts as adduced at the trial, and it would, therefore, 
serve no purpose to re-state them here. 
The defendant has made thirteen assignments of error. 
We shall discuss them in order, though not in each instance 
separately. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE CONTENTION THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
HAD NO JURISDICTION AND THAT THE DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO FILE THE IN-
FORMATION BECAUSE THE INFORMATION WAS FIL-
ED IN A DISRICT COURT BEFORE THE PROCEEDINGS 
BEFORE THE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE WERE 
FILED IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
The record shows the following regarding the commit-
ment of the defendant. 
~ 
The preliminary hearing was held June 29th, June 30th, 
and July 1st, 1948, (JR, pages 7 and 8). The order of com-
. mitment was made and signed by the committing magistrate 
July 1, 1948, (JR. 3). l'he information was filed in the district 
court July 2, 1948, (JR. 9). The transcript of proceedings 
before the committing magistrate was signed by the committing 
magistrate July 6, 1948. (JR. 8), and the order of commitment 
together with the transcript of proceedings before the com-
mitting magistrate were actually filed in the district court 
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July 6, 1948. The defendant's plea to the information was 
made by a motion to quash, entered July 12, 1948. (JR. 11). 
Defense counsel contends that the district court acquired 
no jurisdiction over the matter until the order of commitment 
and the transcript of proceedings before the committing 
magistrate were filed in the district court; that the information 
was filed by the district attorney prior to the filing of the 
order of commitment; that the district court thus had no 
jurisdiction, and that the defendant's motion to quash should 
have been sustained on grounds two and three contained 
therein. (JR. 11) . 
The record shows that the order of commitment was 
actually made and entered of record by the committing magis-
trate on July 1, 1948,- (JR. 3). 
It is the state's position that the jurisdiction of the district 
court attached upon the making and entering of an order of 
commitment, and that the subsequent acts of filing the trans-
cript of proceedings before the committing magistrate and the 
order of commitment are ministerial acts which, at least in the 
absence of prejudicial error, have no effect whatsoever upon 
the jurisdiction of the district court or the authority of the 
district attorney to file the information therein. 
These questions, the validity of the inforn1ation filed in the 
district court before the order of commitment, and the juris-
diction of the district court thus acquired, arose in the case 
of People v. Tarbox, 115 Cal. 57, 46 P. 896. The ~upreme 
Court of California had this to say: 
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((The question * * * is when is the defendant legally 
cotnmitted? We think that occurs when the magis-
trate has acted judicially, and has made and signed the 
order of commitment. His judicial functions then 
cease, and the return of the depositions and order of 
commitment is a mere ministerial duty. In People v. 
Wallace, 94 Cal. 499, 29 P. 950 it was said: (It is 
doubtless true that the order holding to answer must 
be in writing; but when, as a result of an examination, 
such an order has in fact been made and entered upon 
the docket of the justice, it would seem that no further 
action on his part is necessary to authorize the district 
attorney to file an information against the defendant 
for the offense named in the order.' In that case-as 
in the case at bar-the order holding the defendant 
to answer before the Supreme Court was entered upon 
the justice's docket, but was not endorsed on the com-
plaint or depositions.'' 
The . California court has consistently held that a motion 
to set aside the information on the ground that it was filed 
before the record of the preliminary examination and the 
order of commitment by the magistrate was received by the 
clerk of the district court should be overruled where such 
information was filed after the preliminary examination in 
fact had been held and the order of commitment had been 
made and entered of record by the magistrate and where prior 
to the trial the record of t.he preliminary examination and the 
order of commitment are duly filed with the clerk of the 
district court. People v. Bettencouft, 64 Cal. App. 243, 221 
P. 403. People v. Sacramento Butchers Protective Ass'n. et. al., 
12 Cal. App. 471, 107 P. 712, 716, People v. ~' 28 Cal. 
App. 766, 154 P. 34. ~ 
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Furthermore, this rule has been followed elsewhere. In 
the case of Williarns et. id. l'. Stt:~te. 6 Okla. Cr. 373, 118 P. 
1006, 1007, the court stated that: 
~]t is the fact that there was a prelin1inary exan1ination 
or a waiver thereof and a judicial determination thereon 
by the examining magistrate that a felony has been 
committed and that there is probable cause to believe 
the defendant guilty thereof, that authorizes the county 
attorney to file an information in the district court 
charging the crime committed according to the facts 
in evidence on such examination or for the offense 
charged in the preliminary information when such ex-
amination has been waived by the defendant, and such 
an adjudication is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon 
the district court." 
The cases of People v. Thompson, 84 CaL 598, 24 P. 384, 
and People v. Bomar, 73 Cal. App. 3 72, 238 P. 758 are dis-
tinguishable under the rule cited above, in that the order of 
commitment in each case was itself defective. There is nothing 
in the case at bar which indicates any defect in the order of 
commitment itself. 
Counsel for the defendant urges that the California 
statutes are distinguishable from those of this state. A com-
parison of section 105-15-19 Utah Code Annotated 1943, and 
California Penal Code section 872 will show that they are 
practically identical. Defense counsel attempts to distinguish 
them in their headings, but it will be noted that headings to 
sections of the Utah Code are not a part of the legislative 
enactment but rather are merely editorial. 
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Defense counsel further contends that the phrase !(as 
provided in this code" from section 105-17-1 Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943, means ((that all acts required to be done by the 
committing magistrate must be done to confer jurisdiction on 
the district court." (Appellant's brief P. 16). With that 
general proposition we have no quarrel. However, it is our 
position that when the committing magistrate made and entered 
the order of commitment, he exercised the judicial function 
which conferred jurisdiction on the district court under the 
provision of 105-17-1; the subsequent filing of the order and 
transcript of proceedings with the clerk of the distri~t court 
was ministerial merely, and the district attorney had authority 
to file the information. The acts precedent to the conferring 
of jurisdiction on the district court-the making of the order 
of committment, reducing it to writing and its signature by 
the committing magistrate-were all done July 1, 1948, one 
day prior to the filing of the information. 
The order of commitment is regular on its face (JR. 3). 
The transcript of proceedings before the magistrate shows that: 
((The Court found that the offense of Murder in the 
First Degree had been committed; that there was suf-
ficient cause to believe the Defendant, Joe G. Trujillo, 
also known as Joe Garcia Trujillo, guilty thereof; and 
it was ordered by the Court that said Defendant be 
held to answer to said charge; and that he be com-
mitted to the Sheriff of Carbon County without bail." 
(JR. 8, italics added). 
It is true that the affidavit of the magistrate (JR. 50) 
indicates that the order of commitment was not actually 
prepared and signed in the presence of the defendant. It does 
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indicate that this was done later on the same day, July 1, 1948. 
However, the affiant does state uThat at the conclusion of 
the preliminary hearing as aforesaid affiant herein made an 
Order holding the defendant for trial in the District Court 
on the offense set forth in the Complaint on file in the City 
Court of Price, Utah." (J.R. 50). The order was made nat 
the conclusion of the preliminary hearing," and it is submitted 
that the reduction to writing is ministerial. If this delay 
in reducing the order of commitment to writing be error, 
there is nothing in the record to show that the rights of 
defendant were prejudiced thereby, and as set forth above, 
such error would not be jurisdictional. 
Defense counsel's entire argument under points one and 
two of his brief shows nothing that was prejudicial to the 
rights of the defendant. Nor does the record indicate that 
the defendant was prejudiced in any manner by the procedure 
followed in making the order of commitment and in filing 
the information. Section 105-43-1 Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
provides as follows: 
((After hearing an appeal the court must give judgment 
without regard to errors or defects which do not 
affect the substantial rights of the parties. If error 
has been committed, it shall not be presumed to have 
resulted in prejudice. The court must be satisfied 
that it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing 
the judgment." 
It is submitted that the defendant has shown nothing, in 
or out of the record, that would indicate prejudice to the de-
fendant in any manner by the method used in his commitment 
and the filing of the information. 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT, IN INSTRUCTION NO. 2, 
PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN MURDER IN 
THE FIRST AND SECOND DEG~EES. 
In its instruction on murder in the first degree, the trial 
court submitted two theories to the jury: 
((. * * * the slayer must before the commission of the 
act or acts resulting in the death of the deceased have 
deliberately and premeditatedly formed a specific in-
tention or design to kill the person slain; or, must have 
deliberately and premeditatedly formed a specific in-
tention or design to kill another and · in the attempt 
to kill such intended victim kill the person slain in-
stead." (JR. 15 italics added). 
The court then instructed on the element of time for reflection 
and consideration prior to delivering the fatal blow. 
In paragraph 5 of instruction No. 2, which instructs on 
·murder in the second degree, the trial court stated that the 
jury must, in order to find the defendant guilty of murder in 
the second degree, find that: 
(( * * * The slayer before the commission of the 
act resulting in death has a specific design or intention 
thought out before hand to cause great bodily injury 
to the deceased, or an intention or design thought out 
beforehand to do an act knowing the reasonable and 
natural consequences thereof would be likely to cause 
great bodily injury to the deceased." (JR. 16). 
The instruction on murder in the first degree contains 
the words ((deliberately" and premeditatedly;" the instruction 
on murder in the second degree does not. Paragraph 2 of 
the instruction defines these words: 
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n * * * The tern1S, t aforethought, pren1editation, and 
deliberation' mean to think out, plan, or design before-
hand. The term (deliberation,' has the additional 
quality or meaning of planning or designing in a cool 
state of the blood or mind.'' (JR. 15). 
We submit that the trial court adequately distinguished 
between murder in the first degree and murder in the second 
degree. State v. Russell, 106 U. 116, 145 P. (2d) 1005, and 
Stater. Thonzpson, 110 U. 113, 170 P. (2d) 153. 
III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 IN THAT IT DID NOT INSTRUCT 
ON ttMALICE AFORETHOUGHT," OR ttMINIMIZE THE 
REQUIREMENT OF PLANNING, DESIGNING, OR 
THINKING OUT BEFOREHAND." 
Defense counsel urges that the instruction tn the first 
paragraph of instruction No. 6 is erroneous in that it does 
not spell out the equivalent of ttmalice aforethought," that it 
''minimizes the requirement of planning, designing and think-
ing out beforehand." (Appellant's brief p. 24). 
It will be noted that the second and third paragraphs 
of instruction No. 2 (JR. 15) define aforethought, premedi-
tation, deliberation, and malice, and that these definitions are 
clear and complete. In those paragraphs the requirement of 
planning, designing and thinking out of the homicide is 
thoroughly set out. 
We believe the rule to be that jury instructions must be 
construed as a whole, and if, construed all together, they give 
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the necessary elements of the crime, then it is not error that 
one instruction taken alone, is not complete. State v. Evans, 
107 U. 1, 151 P (2d) 196, 198. 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT, IN THE LAST PARA-
GRAPH OF INSTRUCTION NO. 6, LEAVE THE JURY 
TO DECIDE ON ANY THEORY OF THE EVIDENCE. 
The paragraph in question is quoted: 
((OR. If, from any theory of the evidence in this 
case your minds are satisfied beyond all reasonable 
doubt that the defendant fired one or more shots into 
the body of Max Lopez and that before doing so he 
formed a design or intent wilfully, deliberately, and 
premeditatedly to kill either of the persons there pres.ent 
and that such shot or shots were fired pursuant to such 
intent and that a wound or wounds inflicted from the 
firing of any shot or shots so fired caused or contributed 
to the death of Max Lopez, then you should find by 
your verdict that the defendant is guilty of murder 
in the first degree." (JR 22). 
It will be noted that, in the second paragraph of instruction 
No. 2, (JR 15) the court submitted to th~ jury two theories, 
or as they are designated in the Russell case, supra, categories 
for murder in the first degree - deliberate, premeditated, 
specific intent to kill the particular person slain, or deliberate, 
premeditated, specific intent to kill another, in the attempt 
of which the particular person slain is killed. The last para-
graph of instruction No. 6 combines these in the words ttto 
kill either of the persons there present.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
It is submitted that the phrase, ((any theory of the evi-
dence," is limited by that which follows in the quoted para-
graph. Further, under the rule that jury instructions are 
to be construed as a whole, State v. Evans, supra, this phrase 
is limited by the second paragraph of instruction No. 2, and 
its use is not prejudicial error. 
v 
UNDER THE RULE THAT JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
ARE TO BE CONSTRUED l\S A WHOLE, THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN ITS SPECIFIC 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE DEGREES OF HOMICIDE. 
Defendant's assignments of error Numbers VI, VII, and 
VIII are based on the theory that an instruction on one element 
or another is omitted in the specific instructions on murder 
in the second degree, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary 
manslaughter. That is, defense counsel urges that in the 
specific instructions, wherein the law is applied to the evidence 
adduced on the trial, the court in each instruction must set 
forth all essential elements of the particular offense on which 
it is instructing. We do not take this to be so. 
Instruction No. 2 (JR. 15, 16, 17) is the general instruc-
tion on murder in the first degree and included offenses. We 
believe that this instruction spells out the essential elements 
of each offense, and that, when read in connection with the 
specific instructions Numbers 7, 8 and 9, which apply the 
law of the included offenses-murder in the second degree, 
voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter-to the 
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evidence in the case, the jury was properly instructed, and no 
error was committed. Instructions to the jury must be con-
sidered as a whole. State v. Evans} supra. 
VI 
THE COURT COMMITT'ED NO ERROR IN .ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS ON THE EFFECT OF INTOXICATION. 
Defense counsel assigns as error the fact that the trial 
court, in instruction No. 12, did not include a separate para-
graph instructing on intoxication in connection with voluntary 
manslaughter. 
It will be noted that the court did instruct regarding 
the consideration to be given intoxication where the actual 
existence of intent is necessary to a crime. 
((But, whenever the actual existence of any particular 
motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute 
any particular species or degree of crime you may take 
into consideration the fact, if it is shown to be a fact, 
that the defendant was intoxicated at the time in deter-
mining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he 
committed the act." (Instr. 12, JR. 29, italics added). 
The trial court then instructed specifically on intoxication in 
connection with murder in the first and second degrees. 
We submit that the instruction quoted above, together 
with the general instruction on voluntary manslaughter con-
tained in instruction No. 2, (JR. 16) sufficed. 
Defense counsel also assigns as error the fact that the 
trial court, in its instruction on intoxication, · did not instruct 
on . premeditation and deliberation. 
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In the first paragraph of instruction No. 12, (JR. 29) 
the trial court, in instructing on intoxication in connection: : 
. 
with murdet; in the first degree, used the phrase, ~~to think 
out and form the specific design or intent to take the life 
of Max Lopez." In the second paragraph, instructing on in-
toxication in connection with murder in the second degree, 
the trial court used the phrases, (Ito form a design," and nto 
form an intention or design thought out beforehand." 
In instruction No. 2, the trial court defined, among other 
terms, the words ((premeditation" and ((deliberation," stating 
that these terms ({mean to think out, plan or design before-
hand.'' We submit that when these instructions are read 
together, the jury is properly instructed concerning the ability 
to deliberate, meditate, and form an intent to kill when the 
defendant is intoxicated. 
VII 
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED ON 
EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTION OF A FELONY. 
Defense counsel further urges error by the trial court, 
in its instruction on evidence of prior conviction (Instruction 
No. 19, JR. 36). The instruction is as follows: 
~~Evidence has been elicited from the Defendant to 
the effect that he has prior hereto been convicted of 
a felony. You are instructed that such evidence should 
be considered by you only so far. as it may affect the 
credibility of the Defendant as a witness in his own 
behalf.n (Italics added). 
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Defense counsel cites as error the failure of the trial 
court to instruct that prior conviction of a crime is not evi-
dence of guilt, and to define credibility. 
We respectfully submit that the portion of the instruction 
italicised above sufficiently limits the jury in its consideration 
of the evidence of prior conviction of the defendant. 
Counsel cites no authority which requires a definition 
of credibility be given, and we have found none. We believe 
the trial court need not define every material word in an 
instruction, that the court need · not define credibility, and 
that the above quoted instruction is accurate and complete. 
VIII 
DEFENDANT"S RIGHTS WERE IN NOWAY PREJU-
DICED BY THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN INTERPRETER 
IN THE TRIAL. 
Defense counsel assigns as error the facts (a) that the 
court did not control and supervise the interpreter, (b) that 
the court did not instruct the interpreter properly, (c) that 
the court did not control counsel in their employment of the 
interpreter, and (d) that the court did not dispense with the 
services of the interpreter during the direct and cross exami-
nation of the witness, Herrera. 
We shall first consider the contention that the court 
should have dispensed with the services of the interperter 
during the examination of the witness, Herrera. We preface 
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our argument with a citation to an annotation nlJse of Inter-
preter in Court Proceedings,, 172 A. L. R. 923, which presents 
a rather thorough and complete discussion of the cases on the 
subject. The need for use of an interpreter in a trial rests 
in the sound discretion of the trial court. Annotation 172 
A. L. R. 930, and cases there cited. This is the rule also where 
the witness speaks ~~broken English.'' This rule is based on 
the principle that the trial court, being present and observing 
the witnesses, is in a better position than a court of review 
to judge whether or not an interpreter is needed, and if so 
to what extent his use is nece~sary. 
In the case of People v. Santos7 134 Cal. App. 736, 26 
P. (2d) 522, where the accused was charged with the crime 
of rape and an interpreter was used for one of the state's 
v1itnesses, the court stated: 
''The further claim is made that the trial court erred 
when it ordered an interpreter for the witness En-
riquita Valenzuela. It is stated that said witness testi-
fied in English before the grand jury, wrote letters 
in English, and on the trial volunteered certain answers 
in English. The record on appeal discloses neither 
the testimony of the witness before the grand jury nor 
any letters written by the witness. It does app~ar that 
on the trial the witness answered certain simple ques-
tions without the aid of the interpreter by saying, 'Yes' 
or 'Si.' But even assuming that the witness could read, 
write, and speak some English, it does not appear that 
the trial court abused its disc.retion in ordering an in-
terpreter. The propriety of calling an interpreter is 
a question addressed to the discretion of the trial couri 
and its action will not be distttrbed unless it clearly 
appears that such discretion has been abused. People 
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v. Lecang, 213 Cal. 65, 1 P. (2d) 7; 8 Cal. Jur. 225. 
There are authorities indicating that it may be an abuse 
of discretion to refuse to call an interpreter under some 
circumstances, but our attention has not been called 
to any case in which it has been held to be an abuse of 
discretion to call a properly qualified interpreter." 
(Italics added) . 
In the case of People v. Lecang, 213 Cal. 65, 1 P. (2d) 
7, a prosecution for murder, wherein a witness began testifying 
in English and later an interpreter was employed in order to 
facilitate matters, the court held that this was a valid exercise 
of the discretion of the court and did not prejudice the interests 
of the defendant. On this point, the court stated as follows: 
' (It is equally clear that there was no abuse of discre-
tion on the part of the court in permitting the witness 
Emoto to testify through an interpreter. His exami-
nation was commenced without an interpreter, and 
though he understood English to quite an extent, it 
soon became apparent that the calling of an inter-
preter would facilitate matters, as it later proved. This 
was a nzatter tvithin the discretion of the trial court, 
and to our mind the record shows that here there waJ 
a wise use rather than an abuse of such discretion." 
(Italics added) . 
The exercise of· this discretion is subject to appellate 
review, 172 A. L. R. 932, and the appellate court may consider 
the witness' testimony from the record to decide the question 
of abuse of discretion. 172 A. L. R. 934. However, in order 
to reverse on the grounds of abuse of discretionary powers, 
there must be a positive showing of prejudicial error. That 
is, it must be shown that the party complaining was injured 
thereby. In the case of State v. Inich, 55 Mont. 1, 173 P. 230, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19.·' 
234, in a prosecution for n1urder wherein an interpreter was 
used, the Montana court stated: 
nThe statute (section 7894, Rev. Codes) provides, 
(When a witness does not understand and speak the 
English language, an interpreter must be sworn to 
interpret for him.' Whether an interpreter is necessaty 
for a particular witness must be determined by the trial 
court_. and its conclusion is not subject to review by 
this court except fot· a manifest and gross abuse of 
discretion. People v. Salas, 2 Cal. App. 539, 84 Pac. 
295; People v. Ramirez, 56 Cal. 535, 38 Am. Rep. 73. 
Even so error in this particular will not justify. setting 
aside a conviction fully sustained by the evidence, when 
the defendant has apparently suffered no prejudice by 
reason of it. Of course, as counsel say, an interpreter 
should not be called if the witness can understand and 
answer the questions put to hin1. But it is often the 
case that a person who understands and speaks with 
reasonable ease the language of the street or of ordinary 
business encounters difficulty and embarrassment when 
subjected to examination as a witness during pro-
ceedings in court. As we read the record, such seems 
to have been the case with the witness here. We 
therefore do not think the court manifestly in error 
in calling the interpreter.'' (Italics added) . 
In the case of State v. Lee1 116 La. 607, 40 So. 914, the court 
held that, the defense counsel having accepted an interpreter 
and the interpreter having served throughout the trial without 
objection, the defense could not then be heard to object to 
the appointment of the interpreter. 
It is submitted that the record in the instant case shows 
no abuse of discretion by the trial court in the use of the inter-
preter for the witness, Herrera. It is true, as indicated in 
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the defendant's brief (p. 41) that the witness, Herrera, under-
stood some English. However, the extent of his knowledge 
and command of the English language is not shown in the 
record. 
At no time during the trial of the cause did counsel for 
the defendant object to the use of an interpreter or of this 
particular interpreter. On the contrary, at least twice in the 
trial when the witness replied in English, defense counsel 
urged him to reply in Spanish. (R. 59, 65). Furthermore, 
the witness indicated on cross-examination that he was confused, 
and answered incorrectly at the inquest, where he had no 
interpreter. (R. 123). 
The interpreter '\\Tas used from the beginning of the 
direct examination of the witness, Herrera, with no objections 
from defense counsel. We submit that, in order to obtain 
a reversal for the use of an interpreter where it is claimed 
he is incompetent, counsel must make a definite objection to 
a selection or continuance of that interpreter. This question 
arose in the case of State v. Sauer, 217 Min. 591, 15 N.W. (2d) 
1 7, and the court stated as follows: 
c (Defendant insists that a new trial should have been 
granted on the ground that it was error to permit 
Florence Jakkula, the executive secretary of the county 
welfare board, to act as interpreter, in that she was 
interested in the case and did not interpret fairly and 
impartially. The decision of the competency of an 
interpreter rests in the sound discretion of the court. 
No objection was made to her appointment nor to 
her continuing to act. Near the very close of the case, 
when the state was offering rebuttal testimony, counsel 
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for defendant stated: ] insist in order to have regu-
larity here that they use this interpreter as long as 
they have her here., The trial court found no basis 
for considering seriously the objection now being made 
to the interpreter, and we find none." 
Defendant contends Hthat the whole examination and 
cross examination of the witness is impeded, dulled and made 
inaccurate when had through interpretation." ·However un-
fortunate, the use of interpreters is sometimes necessary, and 
express provision is made for their service by statute. 105-46-7 
Utah Code Annotated 1943. The trial court apparently felt 
the necessity in this case. Counsel must also have felt the 
necessity. Nowhere in the record did counsel for the state or 
for the defendant object to the use of an interpreter. Nowhere 
in the record did either counsel object to the use of the par-
ticular interpreter. Defense counsel expressly approved the 
service of this particular interpreter (R. 4) and raised no ob-
jection to his serving during examination of the witness Herrera. 
With defense counsel's claim of error by the trial court 
!Cin permitting the interpreter to dictate, dominate, control, 
intrude or participate in the examination of the witnesses and 
proceedings of the court," we respectfully disag.ree. 
We submit first that no objection to the procedure followed 
was raised by defense counsel on the trial. On the contrary, 
several times defense counsel engaged in conversation with 
the interpreter (R. 124, 163, 169) and in directing questions 
to the interpreter. (R. 134, 135, 136). 
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We further submit that the interpreter did not c (dictate, 
dominate, control, intrude or participate" in the trial. The 
entire problem of translating is most difficult, and the inter-
preter appreciated this (R. 138, 150, 153). As a matter of 
fact, the record shows a sincere effort by the interpreter to 
do a complete and accurate job of translating ideas (R. 138, 
150, 15 3), and an effort on his part to get an accurate state-
ment of the questions from counsel before putting them to the 
witness. (R. 118, 119, 120). 
Whether or not the interpreter dictated, dominated, con-
trolled, intruded or participated in the trial in such manner 
as to constitute error can be determined only by a careful con-
sideration of the entire record. It is our position that he did 
not; that the record shows he did not; that on the contrary, 
the record shows a careful and thorough job of interpreting, 
and nowhere does it show that defendant was prejudiced in 
the interpretation. 
Defendant, in his motion for a new trial, set forth nothing 
indicating error by the court regarding the use and conduct 
of the interpreter except, perhaps, the general allegation 
Ctthat the court * * * has done and allowed acts in the trial 
of said action that are prejudicial to the substantial rights 
of the defendant.'' (JR. 49). Nothing is set forth regarding 
the appointment, employment, or conduct of the interpreter. 
In the case of State v. Cabodi, 18 N. M. 513, 138 P. 262, 
cited and quoted in Annotation 172 A.L.R. 923, 952, the court 
in considering what is required for granting a new trial on 
grounds of misinterpretation, stated: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
((Upon the trial no objection was interposed by ap-
pellant to the interpretation of the evidence, and in 
the motion for new trial no attempt was made to show 
that the interpretation \Yas incorrect by affidavit or 
otherwise, except the mere allegation of such fact in 
the motion. The trial court decided the question 
adversely to appellant, by a denial of the motion, and 
this court cannot go into the question of fact as to 
whether the interpretation vvas, or was not literal. The 
record fails to disclose any inability of the interpreter, 
or that the interpretation was not literal. In such a 
case where it appears that the complaining party is 
aware at the time that the interpretation of the evidence 
is not correct, it is incumbent upon hi~ to call the 
court's attention to such erroneous translation and ask 
to have it corrected, and where he has not such knowl-
edge at the tin1e, but afterward becomes aware of the 
fact, he must set out all the facts in his motion for 
a new trial, pointing out therein specifically the evi-
dence erroneously translated, and support such conten-
tion by affidavit of proof, so that the trial court can 
intelligently pass upon the question." 
We believe this rule should apply generally to objections to 
appointment and conduct of an interpreter. 
The record does not show that formal instruction by the 
court was given to the interpreter. , On the other hand, the 
record shows no objection by counsel for the state or for the 
defendant on this ground. Furthermore, the record we submit, 
shows no prejudicial error because of the lack of such instruc-
tion, and we believe that this matter is therefore not subject 
to review. 
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There being nothing in the record showing abuse or dis-
cretion or prejudicial error by the trial court in selection, use, 
or conduct of the interpreter, those assignments of error are, 
we submit, groundless. 
IX 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE VERDICT. 
This court has said that it is not its province, on appeal 
from a conviction of a crime, to judge credibility of witnesses 
whose testimony conflicts, but that the court is concerned only 
with questions of sufficiency of the . evidence to sustain the 
conviction. State v. Laub, 102 U. 402, 131 P (2d) 805, 
State v. Aures, 102 U. 113, 127 P (2d) 872. 
We agree that there is conflict in the evidence. Defense 
counsel urges that ttthe testimony of the defendant provides 
the only clear and complete version of the incident that recon-
ciles every inconsistent aspect," (Def.'s brief 50) and tiThe 
testimony of the defendant is direct, clear, complete, logical 
and inclusive on all points." (Def.'s brief p. 51). It is 
further urged that the other witness' testimony is ttof doubtful 
probative value,'' because they were drunk, had an interest 
in the matter, or their testimony conflicted in some aspect. We 
submit that it is the province of the jury to determine credibility 
of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence. 
The court submitted the case to the jury on two theories 
as set out in title 103-28-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943: 
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nEvery n1urder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, 
or any other kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious and 
premeditated killing; * * * or perpetrated fron1 a 
premeditated design unlawfully and malicious! y to 
effect the death of any human being other than the 
one who is killed; * * * is murder in the first degree." 
(See par. 3, instruction 2, JR. 15, and related in-
structions.) 
The evidence would appear to clearly support either theory. 
The testimony for the State is lengthy; little purpose 
could be served by setting it forth here. It will be noted that 
this alleged error was one of the grounds for motion for a new 
trial (JR. 49). Apparently it was argued to the trial co~rt, 
and that court saw no basis for it. We submit that the evidence 
amply supported the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the record shows the trial 
court had jurisdiction of the offense as set out in the informa-
tion; it committed no error in its charge to the jury; it committed 
no error in the selection and employment of an interpreter 
on the trial; and that the evidence adduced on the trial amply 
supported the verdict. The defendant had a speedy and fair 
trial; his rights were not prejudiced, and the verdict should 
not be upset. 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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